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Well prior to the invention of the term ‗biology‘ in the early 1800s by Lamarck 
and Treviranus, and also prior to the appearance of terms such as ‗organism‘ 
under the pen of Leibniz in the early 1700s, the question of ‗Life‘, that is, the 
status of living organisms within the broader physico-mechanical universe, 
agitated different corners of the European intellectual scene. From modern 
Epicureanism to medical Newtonianism, from Stahlian animism to the 
discourse on the ‗animal economy‘ in vitalist medicine, models of living being 
were constructed in opposition to ‗merely anatomical‘, structural, mechanical 
models. It is therefore curious to turn to the ‗passion play‘ of the Scientific 
Revolution – whether in its early, canonical definitions or its more recent, 
hybridized, reconstructed and expanded versions: from Koyré to Biagioli, from 
Merton to Shapin – and find there a conspicuous absence of worry over what 
status to grant living beings in a newly physicalized universe. Neither Harvey, 
nor Boyle, nor Locke (to name some likely candidates, the latter having studied 
with Willis and collaborated with Sydenham) ever ask what makes organisms 
unique, or conversely, what does not. In this paper I seek to establish how ‗Life‘ 
became a source of contention in early modern thought, and how the Scientific 
Revolution missed the controversy. 
 
 
 
―Of all natural forces, vitality is the incommunicable one.‖ 
(Fitzgerald 1945: 74) 
 
 
 Introduction 
To ask why there was no controversy over Life – that is, debates specifically focusing on the 
status of living beings, their mode of functioning, their internal mechanisms and above all their 
‗uniqueness‘ within the physical universe as a whole – in the Scientific Revolution is to 
simultaneously run the risk of extreme narrowness of detail and/or of excessive breadth in 
scope. That is, if we take the question ‗why?‘ at face value, a succinct answer can be given right 
away: the Scientific Revolution is an intellectual construct that we owe chiefly to Alexandre 
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Koyré and Herbert Butterfield, and it was entirely focused on the physico-mechanical sciences; 
the latter focus was never modified by one iota in the successive historiographic reassessments 
of this episode which emphasized notably its Puritan, gentlemanly or courtly roots,1 and said 
not a word about the life sciences.2 Hence our concept of the Scientific Revolution does not 
include debates over generation, semina rerum, species, anatomy, vivisection, animal souls, 
irritability and so forth.3 Conversely, the title question appears enormous and unmanageable 
once we realize that it implies many other questions: 
(i) if Life was not a topic of controversy in and for the Scientific Revolution, when did 
it become one?  
This question requires that we decide what counts as a controversy; for surely debates between 
Harvey and Riolan on the heart, or Whytt and Haller on irritability, do not meet the criteria for 
a ‗strong‘ definition of a controversy in the history of science, i.e., in Helga Nowotny‘s 
definition, as ―part of the collective production of knowledge … the very lifeblood of science, 
one of the most productive factors in scientific development‖ (Mendelsohn 1987: 93, see also 
Dascal 1998).  
(ii) How should we then understand the various activities that existed at the time, from 
anatomy and physiology (or the study of the ‗animal economy‘) to medicine overall, 
as well as natural history, botany, chemistry?4 
Notice that even when we discard monolithic concepts of the Scientific Revolution and adopt 
a much more nuanced approach to the disciplinary status and diversity of natural philosophy, 
as Domenico Bertoloni Meli does in an exemplary recent article, emphasizing the interplay 
between the mathematical and medical disciplines, so that ―when unraveling the intellectual 
world in the seventeenth-century, we can no longer separate the history of anatomy from the 
history of science as if anatomists and physicians inhabited a different world from not only 
mechanical and experimental philosophers, but also mathematicians,‖5 this still does not help 
us answer question (ii) above. We could extend the narrative of the Scientific Revolution to 
include debates on the circulation of blood, or the usefulness of the microscope (say, Borelli 
versus Locke), or the epistemological status of the ‗animal economy‘ in relation to machine as 
well as soul.6 Alternatively, we could be more faithful to the actual contents of the reports 
presented to the Royal Society or the Académie des sciences in their first fifty years of 
existence, which turn out to be much more biologically oriented than traditional historiography 
had led us to believe.7 But in either case, these extensions would miss the dimension of ‗crisis‘, 
that is, the sense that the existence of living beings suddenly again becomes an explanatory 
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challenge or even a ―scandal,‖ whether from the standpoint of physics or on the contrary from 
the standpoint of the autonomy of biology.8 
In addition, our title question also implies a historiographic claim about the 
Enlightenment, which follows from (i): 
(iii) Life is a controversial topic for the eighteenth century, not the seventeenth 
(regardless of the varied and significant contributions of Sanctorius, Harvey, 
Glisson, Malpighi, Baglivi, Descartes, Guillaume Lamy, Swammerdam, Van 
Helmont and others). 
This incidentally seems to reverse Foucault‘s claim in The Order of Things that ‗Life‘ did not exist 
before the emergence of biology as a science bearing that name, in the nineteenth century,9 as 
well as the much more common claim, found typically in histories of physiology and related 
textbooks, that the ‗modern‘, functionally specified concept of man as machine successfully 
banished concepts such as ‗Life‘ from science, especially once the ‗machine‘ is augmented with 
Darwinian evolution and the modern synthesis.10 
The irony here is that it is precisely after Cartesian or LaMettrian concepts of bêtes-
machines or hommes-machines that Life becomes a locus of a kind of ontological crisis, either 
because natural philosophers worry about what it is, what its minimal conditions and 
components are, or because they worry about the boundaries between dead matter and living 
matter – such as when Buffon, in his comparison of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, 
ponders the exact nature of ―le vivant et l‘animé‖: whether Life is a metaphysical property of 
certain entities (―un degré métaphysique des êtres‖) or a ―physical property of matter‖; he 
ultimately opts for a kind of ‗panspermist‘ hypothesis in which life is always potentially present 
in matter, notably in the form of organic molecules, so that ―raw matter‖ merely means ―dead 
matter.‖11 Similarly, Gabriel-François Venel, in his long entry ―Chymie‖ for the Encyclopédie, 
states that organic molecules and organized bodies are subject to laws that are different from 
(―essentiellement diverses de‖) the laws of matter in motion; as sources, he refers both to 
Buffon and to the errors of iatromechanist physicians with respect to the functioning of the 
―animal economy‖ (Venel 1753: 410). 
 Lastly, in addition to this revision of the ‗Enlightenment‘ concept, our question also 
raises a specific disciplinary issue in close relation to point (ii) above: 
(iv) Does this emerging ontological concern about Life reflect the constitution of a 
science? Is it a precondition for a science? The concern and its various verbal 
expressions clearly predate the coinage of the word ‗biology‘ in German and 
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French (and its establishment as a science) by roughly a century (Salomon-Bayet 
1981; Caron 1988). 
As I will try to show in closing, the emergence of a ‗field of controversy‘ concerning the status 
of Life is hardly synonymous with the constitution of the science called biology. That does not 
mean it is not productive of forms of knowledge, such as medicine or natural history or in a 
very different kind of categorization, ‗knowledge of the body‘ (see Wolfe and Gal (eds), 2010). 
But by the time the name ‗biology‘ (or its close competitor, ‗zoonomy‘) comes to the fore as a 
―synthetic, unitary science of life‖ (Singer 1929/1958: 917), its concerns are quite different. 
Similarly, the question of the scientificity of medicine and anatomy in the late seventeenth 
century, or their disputed revolutionary status are again not to be confused with the existence 
of controversies over Life. 
In what follows I survey (§ 1) some of the possible candidates for ‗controversies over 
Life‘ in early modern natural philosophy, and argue that we should not think of them in these 
terms; I then turn (§ 2) to the context for where I do believe Life as a problem emerges – in the 
interaction between chemical and metaphysical debates concerning organisms, substance and 
fermentation, notably between Leibniz and Stahl. In a conceptual development which may 
seem rather counter-intuitive to contemporary readers, who tend to believe that ―materialists 
explain everything in terms of matter and motion‖ whereas so-called animists like Stahl or 
vitalists like Bordeu explain everything ―in terms of the soul or vital force‖ (Wellman 2003), 
the specific preoccupation with the nature of organic Life that characterizes Stahl is taken up in 
materialist terms by thinkers such as Diderot, as I discuss next (§ 3). Lastly, I ask, here and in 
the Conclusion, how this materialist focus on Life did and did not become or at least lead to 
the constitution of biology as a science. My analysis spans the periods we call the Scientific 
Revolution and the Enlightenment, but it does not seek to either challenge or rehabilitate these 
terms as historically explanatory categories, although a reader with particular interest in such 
questions might notice that the emergence of Life as a locus of ontological crisis (or 
controversy) roughly matches the shift from the former to the latter. 
 
1. Was Life a controversial topic in early modern natural philosophy?  
If we can speak of early modern life science, from physiology to theories of generation, 
from the chemical investigation of blood, aether and spirits to treatises on fermentation and 
fevers, then we can inquire into its relation to the constitution and stabilization of other parts 
of natural philosophy, such as mechanics and atomistic physics. Figures such as Harvey, 
Descartes and Borelli, or Boyle, Pitcairne and Malpighi, or Charleton and Boerhaave then loom 
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large on the map and if our goal were to revise accounts of the Scientific Revolution so that 
they took account of such figures, it would seem reasonably easy to achieve. However, if we 
hoped to find scientific discoveries which contribute to a unified notion of physiological 
function, we shall not; if we take, e.g., one century of analyses of digestion, from Francesco 
Redi and Giovanni Borelli in the 1650s-1660s to René de Réaumur and Théophile de Bordeu 
in the 1750s, none of the experiments on gizzards and their grinding power, discussed by many 
naturalists, produce any unified result, until Lazzaro Spallanzani conducts experiments on 
digestion in the 1780s (Salomon-Bayet 1978: 336f., 342-343, 355f., 348). 
But, as I have suggested earlier, another problem arises, which is less easy to resolve. In 
the early 1700s Georg-Ernest Stahl, a court physician to Duke Johann Ernst of Saxon-Weimar 
and subsequently, as of 1694, a Professor of Medicine at the University of Halle, stated bluntly: 
in all these competing theories of the human body, notably the very successful mechanistic 
theories, ―Life was never mentioned nor defined, and I could find no logical definition 
provided‖ (Stahl 1706b in Stahl 1859, vol. 2: 224). To follow Stahl‘s suggestion, we could say 
that Life is either discussed but immediately dissipated into the entities and processes which 
subserve it, or promoted to the extent that vital spirits, vital heat, and animation are so co-
extensive to the field of investigation that Life as problem again dissipates into the analysis as a 
whole. There is discussion, but no controversy, in the sense that there is no polarization 
between Life and non-Life (with the notable exception of Stahl in his polemic with Leibniz, 
which I shall turn to in section 2), nor the possibility of resolution between two positions, 
which implies some shared conceptual framework (Freudenthal 1998); resolution or conciliation 
requires at least the sort of quasi-paradigmatic framework into which particular cases such as 
circulation, generation, monsters can be fit, as will happen with Haller in the later eighteenth 
century. Let us consider some representative examples. 
Boyle‘s corpuscularianism, despite its experimental attention to living bodies, the 
‗history of human blood‘, respiration and so forth, holds that both living and nonliving things 
are arrangements of a single universal matter, which is made up of corpuscles. Boyle does not 
want to trace vitality back to a faculty or a power, but rather to a certain arrangement of 
particles; hence vital processes may be considered as separations and recombinations of 
material corpuscles. Blood does not possess an innate faculty which makes it ‗alive‘ but, like 
sweat or snow, possesses its specific chemical properties ―by virtue of the motion, size, figure 
and contrivance of [its]own parts,‖ and new qualities are produced by ―changing the texture or 
motion‖ of bodies‘ constituent corpuscles.‖12 Now, in an interesting passage in his Disquisition 
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About the Final Causes of Natural Things – a work in which Boyle describes the human body as a 
‗hydraulico-pneumatic‘ machine – Boyle appears to grant that there is a kind of category 
difference between ―Living Animals‖ and ―Dead ones,‖ in which the latter are more like 
stones, possessed simply of a static structure. But then he quickly returns to his ‗micro-
mechanical‘ view (even if, qua corpuscularian his mechanism is an enhanced mechanism 
possessed of chemical properties) and explains that the difference lies not only in the 
innumerable ―Liquors, Spirits, Digestions, Secretions, Coagulations‖ but also in the ―Motions‖ 
of the body and its limbs, which are present in living bodies but not in dead ones; in other 
words, a purely structural difference (Boyle 1688: 74-75). 
If we turn to mechanism, including its medical variant, iatromechanism (leaving aside 
here the irreducible variety of forms of mechanism, the incommensurability of their types of 
explanation, including the possibility that iatromechanism may have been ―simply irrelevant to 
biology,‖ and the distinction between a mechanistic ontology and a mechanistic method13), we 
might expect to find a straightforward elimination of vital properties in favour of size, shape 
and motion, including the classic rejection of final causes which is a mark of the Scientific 
Revolution, if we think of Galileo‘s description of the ‗fool‘ in his Dialogues, Simplicio, as a 
cause-finalier, who thinks that horses are on earth for the sake of man, grass is for horses, clouds 
and rain are there for the grass (Galileo 1623/1953: 71), or Bacon‘s exclusion from ―Physick‖ 
of explanations such as ―the firmness of the skins and hides of living creatures is to defend 
them from the extremities of heat and cold : or, . . . the leaves of trees are for protecting the 
fruit‖ (Bacon 1605/2000: 86-87), and of course his ‗barren virgins‘. Equally well-known is 
Spinoza‘s contempt for the human ignorance which projects concepts of purpose onto the 
natural world, expressed notably in the appendix to Ethics I, where he asserts that ―final causes 
are nothing but human fictions,‖ and the preface to Ethics IV, where he writes that what we 
call final cause ―is nothing but a human appetite‖ – the causes of which we tend to be unaware 
of (Spinoza 1675/2002, 239, 240, 321).14 
It is known that the exclusion of final causes (and thus purposive vital faculties, but 
also humors and elements; Anstey 2011) in favour of a mechanistic scientific program 
produced notable drawbacks, such as the difficulty in accounting for epigenetic processes. 
Thus Descartes, who actively promoted the use of mechanical models as heuristics in studying 
the body, famously admitted his inability to account for the processes of generation in terms 
that were compatible with the mechanistic program he had set out for himself: ―The formation 
of all the parts of the human body … is something so difficult that I dare not attempt (to 
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explain it) yet‖ (Descartes to Elisabeth, May 1646, AT IV, 407); as Dennis Des Chene 
comments: ―Among the phenomena of life, generation offers, along with the apparently 
reasoned behavior of higher animals, the greatest challenge to a science based on Cartesian 
principles‖ (Des Chene 2003: 413). Indeed, Descartes‘ ‗failure‘ to explain generation was 
notorious in the eighteenth century, e.g. Réaumur in the Art d’éclore des poulets said that it was 
worse than if Descartes had failed to explain the universe (Gasking 1967: 68). This much is 
well known; the point I wish to emphasize is that everything ‗vital‘ is necessarily excluded from 
mechanistic models, ironically given Descartes‘ repeated insistence on health as an ultimate 
value and his ultimate, post-Cartesian doubt insistence on the survival value of our sensory 
organs. This exclusion is manifest in most of the celebrated pieces of iatromechanist 
propaganda, from Baglivi and Boerhaave: 
Since Physicians began to examine the Structure and Actions of a living Body, not by 
Physico-Mechanical and Chymical Experiments, but by Geometrico-Mechanical 
Principles, they have not only discovered an infinite number of things that were 
unknown to former Ages; but have made it out, that a Human Body, as to its natural 
Actions is truly nothing else but a complex of Chymico-Mechanical Motions, 
depending on such Principles as are purely Mathematical. For whoever takes an 
attentive view of its Fabrick, he‘ll really meet with Shears in the Jaw-bones and Teeth, 
… Hydraulick Tubes in the Veins, Arteries and other Vessels, a Piston in the Heart, a 
Sieve or Straining-Holes in the Viscera, a Pair of Bellows in the Lungs, … Pulleys in 
the Corners of the Eyes. And tho‘ the Chymists explain the Phaenomena of natural 
Things, by the Terms of Fusion, Sublimation, Precipitation &c. And so make a 
separate sort of Philosophy; yet all these ought to be imputed to the Force of a Wedge, 
Balance, Leaver, Spring, and such like Mechanical Principles … the natural Effects of 
an animated Body can‘t be accounted for with greater Facility and Clearness any other 
way… (Baglivi 1696/1704: 135-136) 
 
and 
The solid parts of the human body are either membranous Pipes, or Vessels including 
the Fluids, or else Instruments made up of these, and more solid Fibres, so formed and 
connected, that each of them is capable of performing a particular Action by the 
Structure, whenever they shall be put into Motion ; we find some of them resemble 
Pillars, Props, …, some like Axes, Wedges, Leavers and Pullies, others like Cords, 
Presses or Bellows ; and others again like Sieves, Straines, Pipes … ; and the Faculty of 
performing various Motions by these Instruments, is called their Functions, which are 
all performed by mechanical Laws, and by them only are intelligible (Boerhaave 
1708/1751: 81). 
 
One can see why Stahl protested that Life had vanished from the bio-medical purview! Indeed, 
in a kind of unconscious echo of Stahl‘s concerns, Boerhaave declared in a much-cited lecture 
on the ―use of mechanical methods in medicine‖ that ―the human body is in its nature the 
same as the whole of the Universe‖ (Boerhaave 1703/1983: 96), which I take less as a 
Renaissance-type statement of correspondences and more in the sense of a broadly 
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mechanistic commitment to an ontology in which material particles and their interaction 
exhaustively account for the physical universe including ourselves. 
 In fact, these apparently pure statements of iatromechanism mask a more complex 
(and concrete) reality on the ground, where functional dimensions are never wholly absent 
from physiological explanations – even Descartes will speak of the ―office‖ of the liver (to 
Elisabeth, May 1646, AT IV, 407), and chemical explanations as used in medicine by figures 
such as Willis and Stahl blend, if not seamlessly, quantitative and qualitative definitions of 
fermentation, such that one no longer knows what is a strictly particulate explanation versus 
one on which invokes ‗liquors‘, ‗juices‘, ‗heat‘ and so forth. Consider for instance this elegant 
statement on the body from Bernard de Fontenelle in 1707, ostensibly in the context of a 
discussion of the pituitary gland: 
The human body considered in relation to an infinite number of voluntary movements 
it can perform, is a prodigious assemblage of Levers pulled by Ropes. If one considers 
it in relation to the motion of the liquors it contains, it is another [sort of] assemblage 
of an infinite number of Tubes and Hydraulic Machines. Finally, if one examines it in 
relation to the production of these liquors, it is an infinite assemblage of Chymical 
Instruments or Vessels, Filters, Distillation Vats, Receptacles, Serpentines, etc. . . . The 
greatest Chemistry apparatus of all in the human Body, the most wonderful 
Laboratory is in the Brain, from whence this Extract of the blood is drawn known as 
Spirits, the sole material motors of the entire Machine of the Body (Fontenelle 
1707/1730: 16, my translation). 
 
 Regardless, we cannot view these different variations on the mechanistic program as 
comprising a science of life – or if so, then it is one in which Life as in issue is completely 
absent. One notable exception to this narrative of the ‗absence of Life‘ is Francis Glisson‘s 
Tractatus de natura substantiae energetica, seu de vita naturae ejusque tribus facultatibus perceptiva, appetitiva, 
motiva (1672), usually referred to as De vita naturae. After publishing various significant medical 
works, such as De rachitide in 1650 and De anatomia hepatis in 1654, Glisson produced this 
treatise on the ―life of nature,‖ describing life as immanent to matter: ―life is the intimate and 
inseparable essence of matter‖ and ―matter contains within itself the root of life.‖15 Now, it 
would be easy to dismiss this as a kind of substance metaphysics, as indeed Albrecht von 
Haller did when he both credited Glisson with the discovery of the property of muscular 
irritability and excluded him from the history of science proper (Giglioni 2008); but clearly 
Glisson reflects on the nature of our organic structure (organizatio, § 11), its relation to our 
sense organs, and how animal spirits are not a sufficient explanation of the features of 
‗animation‘ and complex perception which our sense organs display. 
 9 
 However, it remains a challenge to integrate this aspect of Glisson into a Scientific 
Revolution narrative, since it is rather a species of matter theory; what is more, this very 
immanentism means that the nature of Life does not arise as a topic for controversy for 
Glisson. A converse attempt has been made recently by Guido Giglioni to present the 
existence of a ‗vitalistic‘ strain no longer in a marginal but in a central figure, Bacon, focusing 
on the theme of the ‗appetites of matter‘ and the related fixation on the ―prolongation of life‖ 
(Giglioni 2010, 2005). But on the issue of the demarcation of ‗Life‘ as an object (a) that 
requires a specific science or group of sciences and (b) which existing sciences do not 
adequately treat, it seems more relevant that when Bacon is outlining the contents of the Sylva 
sylvarum (published posthumously in 1626), he presents thirteen works as ―physiological 
remains‖ (Bacon 1854, ―Table of Contents‖); out of these, seven concern minerals and six 
concern attractive force and the transformations of inanimate bodies (even if Bacon discusses 
these in biological terms). Thus Bacon does not attend to, or is not concerned with, a 
distinction between the living and the non-living. 
Mechanism, corpuscularianism, Baconian natural philosophy (to which one could add 
Locke‘s Helmontian medical reflections but also his philosophical consideration of the ‗life‘ 
that is the unity and identity of a plant, animal or a man16) do not address the question of Life; 
they do not see it as a problem, or a fortiori an ontological crisis. If it is historically insensitive to 
completely leave out the life sciences from all accounts of the Scientific Revolution, as so many 
do, it is also mistaken to completely gloss over the problem, either in strong terms, such as 
when Harvey is simply described as a bona fide member of the intellectual construct called 
‗Scientific Revolution‘ (―Harvey … tended to stress the importance of observation and 
experiment, an increased emphasis on which was a vital part of that change in outlook which is 
sometimes called the Scientific Revolution‖17), or in weaker terms, such as Peter Dear‘s more 
recent statement that there is ―no reason in principle‖ to ―ignore the sciences of life,‖ since 
‗physics‘ in the early modern period is conceived as inquiry into nature in general (Dear 1998: 
190). Something is missing from this picture. Some scholars, particularly in the humanities, 
would say that what is missing is the body – and an entire sub-discipline of cultural history has 
devoted itself over the past twenty-plus years to studying the historical constitution of the 
body, with particular attention given to its Renaissance and early modern formations.18 But 
precisely, what differentiates a living body from a corpse – a leitmotiv in the concern with Life 
– is heavily determined by the involvement with chemistry. It is to this, via Leibniz, that I now 
turn. 
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2. Machines of nature, ferments and chemical metaphysics 
Mechanistic approaches to Life should not be caricatured as they sometimes are, e.g. by 
Richard Westfall, who described medical mechanism as ―the puppet regime set up by the 
mechanical philosophy‘s invasion‖ (Westfall 1971: 104). Whether in its earliest phases or – 
most evidently – in its late and complexified form such as Albrecht von Haller‘s ‗micro-
mechanical‘ analysis of physiological structure, combining structural and functional 
explanations, these approaches are not blind to the nature of vital processes, but seek to 
heuristically model them, e.g. by the usage of automata, which Borelli cleverly described as 
having ―a certain shadowy sameness (umbratilem similitudinem) to animals‖ (Borelli 1680: II, viii). 
 And yet something has changed by the time of Buffon and Diderot in the late 1740s. 
‗Life‘, ‗organized bodies‘ (corps organisés, organisierte Körper) and gradually ‗organisms‘ are 
everywhere. The Encyclopédie discusses matters pertaining to biological Life far more, 
proportionately, than its predecessor and inspiration of fifty years earlier, Chambers‘ Cyclopedia. 
Conversely, the Encyclopédie has no article on Galileo (whereas Galileo features prominently, e.g. 
in Brucker‘s Historia critica philosophiae, which is a major source of the Encyclopédie; Salomon-
Bayet 1978: 384). In § 4 of his 1753 Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, Diderot gave an 
exhortatory dimension to this state of affairs, and declared that 
We are on the verge of a great revolution in the sciences. Given the taste people seem 
to have for morals, belles-lettres, the history of nature and experimental physics, I dare 
say that before a hundred years, there will not be more than three great geometricians 
remaining in Europe. The science will stop short where the Bernoullis, the Eulers, the 
Maupertuis, the Clairaut, the Fontaines and the D‘Alemberts will have left it. . . . We 
will not go beyond (Diderot 1994: 561). 
 
Similarly, Buffon asserted that ―mathematical truths are merely mental abstractions, which lack 
anything real‖ (―De la manière d‘étudier l‘Histoire Naturelle,‖ in Buffon 1749: 53). Diderot 
also gave an explicitly vital or biologistic inflexion to metaphysics, declaring that ―It is very 
hard to think cogently about metaphysics or ethics without being an anatomist, a naturalist, a 
physiologist, and a physician‖ (Réfutation suivie de l’ouvrage d’Helvétius intitulé L‘Homme [1773-
1775], in Diderot 1994: 813; Wellman 1987: 89, n. 43). What were the roots of this ‗vital‘ 
change? Conceptually, Leibnizianism plays a key role – not necessarily the substance 
metaphysics of Leibniz as he intended it, but the series of deliberate, materialistically and/or 
biologistically inclined misreadings that were produced notably in France during the early 
Enlightenment, when thinkers such as Maupertuis, Bordeu and Diderot explicitly make use of 
concepts such as the monad but turn them into descriptive tools for the theory of generation, 
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deliberately ignoring Leibniz‘s own distinction between the physical and the metaphysical 
(Canguilhem 1980, Wolfe 2010). In a sense it is ironic for this turn towards ‗Life‘ to involve 
Leibniz so strongly, since he notably described organisms as ‗machines of nature‘ which are 
machines down to their smallest parts and rejected extra-causal, mysterious vital forces. What 
did he mean by this? 
Leibniz, like Aristotle, drew heavily on his observations (and reports from 
microscopists such as Leeuwenhoeck) concerning living beings in the formulation of his 
metaphysics of substance. It is not that monads possess uniquely vital properties, but that their 
definition is inspired by the self-maintaining, self-regulating, autonomous features of living 
beings. In addition, Leibniz seems to have coined the term ‗organism‘ in a technical sense to 
mean a type of entity different from machines, synonymous with ‗organized body‘. (I say 
‗technical sense‘ because the term is used even after Leibniz, e.g. in the Encyclopédie – where it 
does occur, contrary to the claims of earlier scholars – in a yet undefined sense of the word, as 
synonymous with ‗mechanism‘.19) But mostly, Leibniz speaks of living beings as ―machines of 
nature.‖ The term first appears in his New System of Nature, published in 1695 in the Journal des 
savants. Machines of nature are machines in their most minute parts (―moindres parties‖), 
contrary to machines created by human artifice (Leibniz 1978, IV: 482); they are machines to 
infinity also in the sense that bodies contain seeds which can never be destroyed (ibid., 475). He 
also specifies that it is living bodies which are machines of nature (Monadology, § 64 and for a 
full discussion of this notion in Leibniz, Fichant 2003). This is where the terminology of 
‗organism‘ starts to appear: ―The organism of a living being (organismus viventium) is nothing 
other than a divine mechanism which is more subtle than an ordinary mechanism in the 
infinity of its subtlety‖ (Leibniz 1961: 16, § 13; Leibniz 1978, I: 15). Due to the law of the 
conservation of force among other reasons, Leibniz refuses to allow for any type of extra-
causal influence on bodies of a vital principle that would be separate from bodies as a whole. 
Hence he denies a concept of soul as the motive force or controller in the body, which is what 
Stahl put forth. Leibniz insists that everything that happens in Nature happens according to 
mechanical laws. Of course, Leibniz also holds that Life stems from a ―deeper source‖ than 
the ontological level of mechanically specifiable Nature, which remains at the level of 
passivity.20 
This aspect of Leibniz – that there is something unique about living beings, and this 
uniqueness is metaphysically grounded – was strongly brought to the fore by a series of his 
disciples precisely concerned with ‗biophilosophy‘ and, increasingly, with the difference 
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between organic and inorganic entities: Louis Bourguet in the 1720s and, better-known, 
Charles Bonnet a generation later. Bourguet, in the course of an extensive analysis of crystals, 
developed an original notion of ―organic mechanisms‖ (méchanismes organiques) which 
functioned in a different way than ordinary mechanisms, and directly influenced Buffon‘s idea 
of ―organic molecules.‖ He suggested that there was a difference between the growth of 
crystals by juxtaposition or the ―apposition of new parts,‖ and the organic process of 
intussusception by which new molecules are integrated into the organic body and form a part of it 
– a distinction repeated almost exactly in the second half of the eighteenth century by 
Linnaeus, Bonnet, Lamarck and others.21 The distinction between ‗apposition‘ and 
intusussception‘ is between two forms of growth, the former characteristic of minerals (such as 
crystals), and the latter characteristic of plants and animals, which is the ―intussusception of a 
new matter‖ (Maupertuis 1746: 44). Bonnet plays on the French word for organic growth (the 
verb croître) and says that crystals merely agglomerate (accroître) rather than actually grow (croître) 
(Bonnet 1768, vol. 1, ch. XII, §§ 170, 210: 143, 189, 191). Bourguet describes ―organic 
mechanisms‖ in Leibnizian terms as a combination of various types of molecules – from 
aether, water, earth, the air, etc. – which are subordinate to a ―dominant Monad or Activity‖ 
(Bourguet 1729, 4th letter, 164-165). Bonnet explicitly declares that ―nutrition, development 
and the formation of a new organized being are the products of an unknown force . . . which has 
nothing in common with mechanical forces‖ (Bonnet 1764: 92, emphasis mine) and more 
humorously, that ―I have always led my reader back to the Being of beings, and shown his 
handiwork in all the products which had falsely been traced back to purely mechanical causes, 
as if an animal had the same origin as a cheese‖ (Bonnet was Swiss, after all).22 
But let us return to the discussion with Stahl, since it is essentially here that Leibniz 
develops a concept of organism, because Stahl, in a combination of medico-physiological and 
chemical reflection, insists repeatedly on Life. To put it differently, the recognition of ‗Life‘ as a 
problem (which goes hand in hand with the formulation of ‗organism‘ as a concept) is an effect 
of Leibniz‘s debate with Stahl, since their disagreement specifically centres on Stahl‘s assertion 
that the organism obeys causal laws which are different from those operating in mechanical 
nature overall, an assertion Leibniz cannot accept although he too wishes to defend a concept of 
organism (Duchesneau 1995, Carvallo 2010). And, especially on Stahl‘s part, the 
conceptualization of what an organism is and how it differs from a mechanism (or, which is 
much the same, how a living body differs from a dead body) centrally involves chemistry (or 
‗chymistry‘23); hence Life becomes an object of controversy. I shall now discuss this chemical 
contribution to the emergence of ‗Life‘ as an ontologically problematic entity (notably with the 
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concept of fermentation, and the consequent role of analyses of digestion) before turning, in 
section 3, to the radical materialist appropriation of these inseparably chemical and 
‗biophilosophical‘ elements, and its relation to the constitution of ‗biology‘. 
If we recall Bourguet‘s distinction between the formation of crystals by juxtaposition of 
their components, versus organic entities which are formed by the intussusception of their 
molecules, the issue with chemistry – particularly the notions of fermentation and ‗seeds‘ (what 
Gassendi called, using a Lucretian term, semina rerum; the difference is that for Lucretius these 
‗seeds‘ were simply atoms, whereas for Gassendi they were composites or compounds of 
atoms24) – revolves around a distinction between beings that are merely ‗formed‘ and beings 
that are ‗generated‘. It is only in the late seventeenth century that this distinction becomes 
crucial – both because the list of candidates for the latter gradually gets defined more narrowly, 
so it can no longer includes metals, crystals and minerals, and because the iatrochemical 
Paracelsian-Helmontian-Sylvian-Stahlian tradition of ‗chymistry‘ strongly focuses on the 
processes that are unique to organic beings, such as fermentation.25 
A major source for this idea of fermentation is Thomas Willis (1622-1675), who taught 
natural philosophy at Oxford and medicine in London; he was best known perhaps for his 
discovery of the ‗circle of Willis‘ and his great work on the anatomy of the brain (De cerebri 
anatome, 1664, richly illustrated by Christopher Wren). But the work that concerns us is his De 
fermentatione (1659), translated as A Medical-Philosophical Discourse of Fermentation; or, Of the Intestine 
Motion of Particles in Every Body. De fermentatione was meant to be the introduction to his theory of 
fevers, which in fact he explained as the outcome of a vitiated fermentation of blood (Willis 
also says that he added a treatise on fever to the one on fermentation in order to apply his 
fermentation theory to fever). ―Every disease acts its Tragedies by the strength of some 
Ferment‖ (Willis, in Debus 2001: 69). Is fermentation chemical or mechanical? The 
iatrochemical answer should be straightforwardly the former, since it describes all material 
bodies as being composed of the principles of Spirit, Sulphur, Salt, Water and Earth and the 
mixture and proportion of these.26 But Willis complicates matters by sometimes speaking of 
fermentation in more purely chemiatric terms, sometimes in more mechanical terms, as a 
motion of the parts. Ferments helped kindle the particles of spirit and sulphur in the blood 
into a flame, a combustion that was also called effervescence of the blood, which is how Willis 
explains body heat and fever. The fermentation in the heart heats the blood like ―Water 
Boyling over a Fire,‖27 and this heat is distributed to the whole body through blood circulation, 
constituting the common cause of ordinary body warmth as well as febrile heat. Our body heat 
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is the effect of a chemical cause – specifically, of fermentation.28 And, most relevantly for us, 
―The first beginnings of life proceed from the spirit fermenting in the heart‖ (Willis 
1659/1681, ch. V: 13). 
Stahl, too, viewed the body as composed of organic matter in a process of 
fermentation, which in fact meant it was vulnerable to putrefaction – indeed, always in a 
process of putrefaction in some sense. Some parts of the body are more vulnerable than 
others, notably the blood; hence Stahl describes circulation as a process which preserves the 
mixtio of the blood and thereby maintains the stability of the whole. This is a good example of 
how his system renders the chemical and the metaphysical almost indissociable, in his 
description of the living body as a kind of dynamic equilibrium which constantly has to be 
maintained. On the one hand this equilibrium is chemically specified, both at the level of the 
concept of fermentation and with the description of the body as a chemical mixtio, not a mere 
aggregate – aggregates are merely mechanical combinations of portions of matter in motion, 
whereas mixts imply a notion of qualitative diversity above and beyond the spatial proximity 
between particles. (This distinction, which is crucial for Stahl, will be wholly appropriated by 
Diderot who uses it to define the relation between matter in general, living, sensing individual 
molecules and the ‗sensitivity of the whole‘). Leibniz reiterated this in his own terms: ―a mass 
of matter is not properly what I call a corporeal substance, but rather an aggregate of an 
infinity of such substances, like a pack of sheep or a pile of worms.‖29 On the other hand, Stahl 
famously describes the body and its organs as literally mere instruments of the soul, a position 
sometimes revised so that ―organs are not, as the name might suggest, mere instruments,‖ but 
nevertheless, ―it is the soul that makes the lungs breathe, the heart beat, the blood circulate, the 
stomach digest, the liver secrete‖ (Stahl 1706a, § xcviii, in Stahl 1859: 347). Put these two 
together and you have the notion of a ―highly fermentable organic body [which] has to rely on 
a vigilant anima to discharge the corrupt and harmful materials from the vital economy in a 
timely manner.‖30 
These concepts of fermentation are closely linked to concepts of Life, and indeed were 
actively taken up in the second half of the eighteenth century by vitalists, notably when dealing 
with the phenomenon of digestion. Whereas mechanists or ‗solidists‘ (who held that illness is 
due to a pathological change in the solid parts of the body, as opposed notably to humoralists), 
but also Newtonian-inspired physicians including Boerhaave and Pitcairne reduced digestion to 
a quantitative process of ‗trituration‘, of spatial relations between masses, or more specifically 
the expansion and contraction of muscles, iatrochemical physicians and post-Stahlian chemists 
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like Gabriel-François Venel, in his articles for the Encyclopédie including ―Chymie,‖ ―Chaleur,‖ 
―Digestion‖ and ―Mixte,‖ emphasized the chemical transformations of the substances involved 
in the digestive process. Thus François Boissier de Sauvages, in his Nosologie méthodique 
(originally published 1763), explains that the faculties of the body are equivalent to the 
properties of matter in general (e.g. gravity, elasticity and attraction), but that within the organism 
these produce processes of fermentation and putrefaction which seem to be restricted to living 
beings (Sauvages 1763/1771, I, §§ 150-154, 261, 266). 
Of course, the mechanical explanations of digestion are augmented with processes 
such as heat, vibration, the action of the spirits, and continuous compression, recalling our 
earlier point that it is not always appropriate to fully distinguish the ‗mechanical‘ and the 
‗purposive‘ or the ‗functional‘, in seventeenth- or eighteenth-century physiology and natural 
philosophy. Sauvages believed that the fully self-contained nature of his calculations on the 
body‘s energy proved the existence of an independent soul which was the source of this 
motion, and – surprisingly, we would think, for an ‗animist‘ – praised the discoveries of Baglivi, 
Pitcairne, Newton and Boerhaave precisely for their calculations as applied to the body 
(Sauvages 1731: 2). As Roger French comments, ―it is something of an ‗ism‘ paradox that the 
eighteenth-century ‗mechanists‘ generally described the body in non-quantitative terms whereas 
the ‗animists‘ used mathematics to demonstrate the need of a soul to power the machine of the 
body‖ (French 1990: 103). A missing term in this opposition between mechanism and animism 
is vitalism. 
 Organisms, ferments and digestive systems all have some more or less obvious, more 
or less intuitive relation to an idea we might call ‗Life‘, and indeed gradually, from the 
iatrochemists to Stahl, and onwards to his disciples in the mid-eighteenth century and their 
Auseinandersetzungen with the group of physicians who come to be called vitalists by the dawn of 
the next century,31 these kinds of phenomena, together with more broad research programmes 
such as physiology (as opposed to anatomy), are being presented as specifically vital. Venel, in 
the article ―Chimie‖ in the Encyclopédie, speaks of ―changes‖ which bodies undergo, such that 
they ―move from the non-organic state to the organic state,‖ and suggests that the 
―phenomena of organisation [i.e. organism, organic phenomena, CW] should be treated by a science 
separate from all other parts of Physic‖ (Venel 1753: 410). Where is the crisis, then? What 
happened to the ontological controversy? Remember that Stahl had spoken in fairly strong 
terms, if not of scandal then at least of shock: ―What shocked me above all was that in this 
physical theory of the human body, Life was never mentioned nor defined, and I could find no 
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logical definition provided‖ (Stahl 1706, in Stahl 1859, vol. 2: 224). And throughout the 
collection of essays entitled Theoria medica vera, he asks about ‗what we call Life‘, ‗what purpose 
does it serve‘, within and outside the body? Stahl is challenging a dominant, and vast set of 
views partly encapsulated under the term mechanism, or specifically iatromechanism. He does not 
respond with a coherent model (program, unifying concept, etc.) of something like 
‗organicism‘ which other physiologists and teaching physicians could both apply and improve 
on, as Haller precisely did with his physiological model (usually referred to as the Göttingen 
school, see Steinke 2005). Had Stahl done so we could then study various tensions between 
mechanistic medicine, physiology and chemistry and organicist medicine, physiology and 
chemistry as bona fide controversies. 
From an external standpoint, as historians or onlookers in general, the problem is not 
so much to find a definition – at the present time we still have not agreed on a definition of 
Life, or what constitutes its exact ‗origin‘32 – as to understand why it becomes a problem and 
what the effects of this problem are. One response, a fairly rhetorical one, is Théophile de 
Bordeu‘s (Bordeu was a celebrated Montpellier vitalist, friend of Diderot – who turned him 
into a character in D’Alembert’s Dream – and collaborator of the Encyclopédie): ―Spare us, once 
and for all, all these tiny fibres, pressures, globules, thick substances, sharp angles, lymph, 
hammers and all the rest of the equipment from mechanical workshops with which [earlier 
doctors] filled the living body – they were the playthings of our fathers‖ (Bordeu 1764 in 
Bordeu 1818, II: 670). Another possible answer to the ‗why?‘ question is suggested less 
rhetorically by Peter Hans Reill: ―if mechanism could, e.g., explain the pumping action of the 
heart, it was incapable of saying why the heart continually kept pumping without running 
down‖ (Reill 2005: 135). Obviously, for Stahl a major part of the answer lay in the soul, and 
specifically its purposive, goal-directed action – a view which earned him the ridicule of many 
prominent scientists, such as Haller, who suggested that Stahlians (who rejected interventionist 
medicine in the face of disease) were to mechanist physicians like a half-naked ancient German 
warrior was, compared with an armed Roman centurion, in uniform.33 One can also try and 
reconstruct Stahl‘s often unnecessarily obscure argumentation in a charitable way, and point 
out that he never denies the basic laws of physics and chemistry, nor the fact that living bodies, 
too, obey the laws of motion. As we saw with fermentation, the idea is rather to articulate a 
kind of ‗emergentist‘ view in the weak sense that certain arrangements of particles exhibit 
complex, goal-directed behavior.34 
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However, Stahl is quite adamant that the above be attributed to the soul – which then 
controls the various mechanically specifiable parts of the body as so many instruments. Stahl is a 
teleologist, who definitely believes that ―The question, ‗What is life?‘ lay behind everything I 
learned. Life seemed to be characterized by a peculiar reasonableness and purposefulness of 
instinctive involuntary action‖ – even if these words belong to another German, in the mid-
twentieth century: Wilhelm Reich (Reich 1968: 45). But all of the new chemical concepts he 
both appropriates and innovates with, allow of both an anti-reductionist interpretation (his own), 
and a reductionist interpretation – which is not specifically mechanistic, as we shall see – with 
materialists such as Buffon and Diderot. And in this reductionist approach, the vital dimension 
is not discarded. 
 
3. Constitutive materialist ontology of Life or gradual constitution of biology? 
Neither biology nor chemistry exist as stable theoretical entities in the early modern or 
Enlightenment periods, even if chemistry had existed for a long time, but on unstable 
methodological and conceptual bases. Yet the constitution of an autonomous ontological 
region corresponding to ‗the science of living beings‘, i.e. biology, is significantly affected by 
chemistry, as we have seen. One way to describe this is to say that chemistry is, at least at this 
time, the science which ―allows for an understanding of matter as something that – at least 
provisionally – cannot be reduced to calculation‖ (Starobinski 1999: 86). Recall Buffon and 
Diderot‘s anti-mathematical proclamations of a new science of Life (―natural history,‖ but also 
the study of the ―animal economy‖ in medicine), or the prominence of vital matters in the 
Encyclopédie. 
Iatrochemical, Stahlian concepts that merge the chemical and the metaphysical are 
turned into reductive materialist concepts by Diderot (reductive notably in the sense that they 
are meant to replace explanations that appeal, e.g. to the soul), yet these concepts are not 
themselves meant to be mechanically or ultimately, mathematically specifiable. This takes 
several interrelated forms: Diderot‘s enriched atomism of vital minima, in which the ‗atoms‘ or 
‗molecules‘ of living matter are themselves alive; his transformation of Hallerian irritability via 
Bordeu‘s concept of sensitivity (sensibilité) into a concept of organic sensitivity which is itself a 
property of living matter. The difference between irritability and sensitivity in Haller is that the 
former is fully mechanically specifiable and is strictly a property of muscle fibres, while the 
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latter has a functional component as it is directed towards the organism‘s survival, and it 
presupposes the existence of the ‗soul‘. 
In Diderot, this difference is collapsed into one property of living matter, with some 
waverings as to whether this property occurs in the elements or only in organized wholes, but 
he seems to opt ultimately for the latter. Sensitivity and therefore Life require, according to 
Diderot, the presence of organic ―continuity‖ rather than mere spatial ―contiguity‖ (Diderot‘s 
terms, which map onto Stahl‘s distinction between aggregate and mixt; Diderot 1994: 625-628, 
Boury 2006, Wolfe 2006). The difference between the life of an organic being and the life of a 
wooden automaton, or a watch, is not that the former possesses a soul, or is free, whereas the 
latter is not. The difference is, one might say, a structural one, between two different types of 
arrangements of parts. This is what Leibniz, a favorite author of Diderot‘s, meant when he 
declared that ―a feeling or sensing being is not something mechanical like a watch or a 
windmill‖ (Preface to the New Essays, in Leibniz 1978, vol. 5: 59) or, in Diderot‘s version, 
which reflects his annoyance with the prevalent clock metaphor: ―What a difference there is, 
between a sensing, living watch and a golden, iron, silver or copper watch!‖ (Elements of 
Physiology, in Diderot 1994: 1283). 
It is for this reason that the concept of ‗mechanistic materialism‘ is so problematic, and 
perhaps downright false (Kaitaro 1987): because most materialists, unlike Descartes, do not 
claim that physical nature is essentially specifiable in mechanistic terms. Diderot‘s challenge is 
to be able to do justice to the difference between organic and inorganic beings, without having 
reference to a concept of ‗soul‘, anima, as the basis of animation – given that the distinction 
between ‗animate‘ and ‗inanimate‘ initially means ‗possessed-of-soul‘ versus ‗not-possessed-of 
soul‘ (Cunningham 2003: 58). This will be the concept of active, sensing matter. Hence his 
materialism is significantly focused on the concept of Life. It is in this sense that his 
―revolutionary‖ fervor (of ―We are at the dawn of a revolution‖) is not just a way of 
participating in the emergence of biology as a science, since it is also a philosophical project. 
Consider the article ―Spinosiste‖ of the Encyclopédie, by Diderot:  
SPINOSIST: follower of the philosophy of Spinosa. One must not confuse the ancient 
Spinosists with the modern Spinosists. The general principle of the latter is that matter 
is sensitive; they demonstrate this by the development of the egg, an inert body which 
by the sole means [instrument] of graduated heat moves to the state of a sensing, living 
being, and by the growth of any animal which in its inception [principe] is merely a 
point, and through the nutritive assimilation of plants and – in one word – of all 
substances that serve the purpose of nutrition, becomes a great sensing and living 
body in a greater [expanse of] space. From this they conclude that only matter exists, 
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and that it is sufficient to explain everything. For the rest, they follow ancient 
Spinosism in all of its consequences (Encyclopédie XV: 474 / Diderot 1994: 484). 
 
No one has ever produced a satisfactory explanation as to why Diderot chooses to place an 
affirmation of his biologically motivated metaphysics within an entry on a philosopher (or a 
derivative of the philosopher, as the article ―Spinoza‖ is a piece of theological boilerplate 
intended to reassure censorious readers who would logically turn to see what the Encyclopédie 
had to say about this scandalous figure) who did not himself think there was anything 
metaphysically unique about living beings. The first scholar to call attention to it, Paul 
Vernière, invented a category to describe precisely this biologically reconceptualized 
Spinozism: he called it ―neo-Spinozism.‖ Vernière meant by this a form of holist materialism 
founded on the life sciences rather than on a priori metaphysical speculation (Vernière 1954/1982: 
529); what ―neo-Spinozism‖ – which he attributes not just to Diderot but to Maupertuis –  
does is ―refashion a monism more in accordance with the findings of science‖ (533). In the 
present context I will content myself with the observation that the difference between ―ancient 
Spinosists‖ and ―modern Spinosists‖ effectively maps onto the historical narrative I have been 
suggesting: whereas ancient Spinosists are essentially substance metaphysicians, their modern 
descendents are essentially focused on Life, specifically, the radical implications of the 
biological theory of epigenesis. 
Harvey, who is supposed to have coined the term, defines epigenesis as ―the 
superaddition of parts… out of the power or potentiality of the pre-existent matter‖ (Harvey 
1653: 223). More specifically, epigenesis is the theory of generation (or development as we 
would now call it) in which the characteristics and structure of the mature organism may be pre-
determined in the embryo, but are not ―pre-imprinted‖ in it. Rather, they are acquired during the 
course of a gradual development, in which the embryo undergoes transformations under the 
influence of the environment. In this sense, it is opposed to the preformationist theory, according to 
which all the characteristics of the developed organism correspond directly to characteristics 
―imprinted‖ in the embryo.  Thus epigenesis versus preformationism seem like the basis for a 
controversy in the theory of generation. We might think that we have finally encountered a 
proper controversy over Life; but in fact it is not one until Diderot takes hold of it. Or rather, 
to introduce a distinction, if ‗preformationism versus epigenesis‘ is a controversy in the life 
sciences, beginning fitfully in the early 1700s in the Académie des sciences and reaching full 
velocity with Haller, Wolff, and Blumenbach in the late years of the century, what happens 
with Diderot is that it becomes, precisely in the wake or rather the vein of Stahl, an ontological 
controversy. This is most explicit if we add to the entry ―Spinosiste‖ a passage from 
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D’Alembert’s Dream, the first sentence of which François Jacob in fact used as an epigraph for 
his La logique du vivant: 
Do you see this egg? With this you can overthrow all the schools of theology, all the 
churches of the world. What is this egg? An unsensing mass, prior to the introduction 
of the seed [germe]; and after the seed has been introduced, what is it then? Still an 
unsensing mass, for the seed itself is merely an inert, crude fluid. How will this mass 
develop into a different [level of] organisation, to sensitivity and life? By means of 
heat. And what will produce the heat? Motion (Diderot 1994: 618). 
 
Aside from its stated radical dimension (to overthrow all schools of theology), there is also 
clearly something ‗vital‘ about the commitment to epigenesis, or even vitalistic, as Hans 
Driesch observed: ―All believers in epigenesis are Vitalists‖ (Driesch 1914: 39; see Oyama 
2010). 
The transformative, ‗epigenetic‘ dimension of living beings, which fascinates Diderot 
(―Voyez-vous cet œuf ?‖) or La Mettrie (who uses Lucretian motifs to describe the living Earth 
as like a womb (utérus) which has now grown barren, so that new species do not arise35), which 
also fuels the fascination with monsters, is very far removed from the set of possible criteria 
for the science of biology by the early nineteenth century, which include a reductive constraint 
on explanations of living beings in terms of their physico-chemical nature, a unification 
criterion which states that all living entities (including plants and animals) possess properties 
such as development, reproduction, nutrition, respiration, beginning in a basic substance 
(protoplasm) and ultimately arriving, by the mid-nineteenth century, at the study of 
development, focusing on structure and function (morphology and anatomy versus 
physiology); at this point biology also requires cell theory in order to explain cellular division 
and conjugation, and has to incorporate evolutionary and ecological components (Singer 
1929/1958, Caron 1988, Barsanti 2000). It is no surprise that Cuvier by 1810 can declare that 
―the anatomical portion of the general problem of life has been resolved for a long time, at 
least as concerns the animals which interest us the most‖ (Cuvier 1810, II, ―Histoire naturelle,‖ 
207). 
 To reiterate the point otherwise, the various instances of an emerging ‗life science‘ in 
the eighteenth century – from the renewal of theories of generation to Haller‘s work on 
irritability, to pieces of ‗folk biology‘ such as Trembley‘s polyp or Bonnet‘s aphids (Roe 1981, 
Lenhoff and Lenhoff 1989) are not themselves identical with an ontological concern with the 
status of Life. To conflate these two would be to create a monolithic concept of vitalism which 
would somehow lead inexorably to the constitution of biology as a science. As much as 
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Buffon, Haller, Barthez, Blumenbach, Bordeu, Venel, Diderot and especially Ménuret de 
Chambaud insist on the separation between life sciences and physical sciences – a separation 
which formally culminates in Bichat, Cabanis, and Bernard – it is not clear that all these figures, 
and certainly not Bichat or the ‗founders‘ (or at least coiners) of biology Lamarck, Treviranus 
and Carl Christian Erhard Schmid (the author of Physiologie philosophisch bearbeitet, 1798-1801)36 
care about ontology. After all, no less a figure than the head of the Montpellier vitalists, Paul-
Joseph Barthez, declared ―I am as indifferent as could be regarding Ontology considered as the 
science of entities‖ (Barthez 1806, vol. 1: 96, n. 17). It is true that some of these figures viewed 
these episodes of the coming-to-be of biology as not conforming to the laws of mechanics (or 
even violating them), and thus placing ―in serious difficulty the traditional paradigm, based on 
the sovereignty of physics‖ (Barsanti 2000: 124). Thus the geologist Jean-Claude Delamétherie 
(not to be confused with Julien Offray de La Mettrie) declared that the living being was ―a 
machine that confounds all our ideas of mechanics.‖37 But the more a science of biology 
emerges the less it is concerned with the ontological crisis about Life. My interest here is more 
in the problematic status of Life in between historical categories such as the Scientific 
Revolution and the Enlightenment, and less to produce some a-historical typology of 
controversies; but one is tempted to venture a distinction between an ontologically controversial 
moment (Stahl, and its materialist version in Diderot) and a functionally controversial moment 
that emerges with the positive science of life. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 Why was there no controversy over Life in the Scientific Revolution? This episode (or 
absence thereof) is very difficult to make sense of in terms of familiar concepts such as 
‗paradigms‘ or ‗normal science‘, for at least two reasons. First, since the sciences involved in 
the constitution of Life as a problem are not unified, discursively, experimentally or by their 
objects, whether we speak of alchemy, natural history, iatrochemical medicine or ‗metaphysical‘ 
reflections on vital minima and the relation of body and soul; as Claire Salomon-Bayet nicely 
suggests, it would then have to be a ―permanent revolution‖ (Salomon-Bayet 1978: 15, 
Salomon-Bayet 1981: 36, 39) lasting one hundred and fifty years (in her case the object is the 
study of life in the Académie des sciences; we could just as well say ‗from Harvey to Pasteur‘38). 
Second, by the time it (biology, medicine, etc.) is a science and is perhaps on the way to 
producing normal vs. abnormal patterns of discourse (say, Pasteur versus Pouchet on 
spontaneous generation or Cuvier versus Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire on the the plan d’organisation, 
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mentioned in Dascal 1998) then it has lost its ontological dimension and thus its sense of being 
a crisis or a scandal – even if figures such as Hans Driesch at the end of the nineteenth century 
can effectively replay Stahl versus mechanism, invoking Aristotelian entelechies just like Stahl 
did. This lack of fit between the various strands of the ‗Life‘ narrative in early modern science, 
and Kuhnian concepts such as paradigms, is sometimes used to demonstrate that Kuhn‘s 
concepts might not work here (Salomon-Bayet 1981), even if some attempts have been made, 
unsuccessfully, to interpret notably Haller‘s enhanced mechanistic model for physiology as 
precisely a ―paradigm shift‖ (Toellner 1977). What it tells us here is not so much a matter for 
Kuhnian philology as a problem for understanding the development of biology as a discipline 
and how it relates to the more ontologically oriented discussions of the previous century (from 
the core years of the Scientific Revolution to the SpätAufklärung). 
If Life and the investigation into Life is not then manageable as a Scientific Revolution 
narrative, we can of course revise the latter to include more discussion of animal spirits, of 
Newton‘s queries on sensation and their influence on biomedicine in the next generation, and 
of course of the shift from a notion of ‗soul‘ to various embodied, cognitive and even 
neuropsychological concepts. We can also insist on the presence of quantitative 
experimentation, notably in the Italian anatomists. But we will not able to reconstruct a 
controversy over Life within the frame of the development of biology. In the seventeenth 
century Life is either everywhere, as in Gassendi or Glisson, but it is immediately dissipated 
into the entities and processes which mechanistically subserve it, or promoted to the extent 
that vital spirits, vital heat, ferments, seeds and other forms of animation are so co-extensive to 
the field of investigation that Life again dissipates into the analysis as a whole. There is 
discussion, but no controversy, in the sense that there is no polarization between Life and non-
Life. In the eighteenth century, with Stahl and Diderot, Life becomes a ‗crisis‘ concept – with 
anti-reductionist and reductionist trajectories, respectively – until by the early nineteenth 
century it resolves into being a structural concept with no ontological component. This is 
patently the case in Claude Bernard – a careful reader of Diderot, who left behind an 
unpublished manuscript on the latter‘s medical and physiological writings (Barral 1900) – for 
whom vitality is an effect of a particular type of physical organization, and nothing more: 
―l‘élément ultime du phénomène est physique; l‘arrangement est vital.‖39 
We could conclude, following a hint of François Duchesneau‘s, that the concept of 
‗Life‘ is an artificial construct, an être de raison created when rationality runs up against the 
speculative limits of a physiological theory that experience cannot wholly circumscribe 
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(Duchesneau 1982: 487). But what about the ―revolutionary‖ force of epigenesis? The sense 
Diderot had that he and others were ―on the verge of a great revolution in the sciences,‖ but 
not a revolution that was subsumed under an autonomous science of biology? As I have tried 
to describe, this ―great revolution‖ which did not happen at least as envisaged by Diderot, 
combines the ontological crisis component of Stahlian animism with the new materialist focus 
on epigenesis and other key features of biological entities (―modern Spinosism,‖ as Diderot 
calls it). It is neither a feature of the Scientific Revolution nor of the Enlightenment per se; 
borrowing a term from political history, it is more of a Sattelzeit – Reinhart Koselleck‘s term for 
epochs which lie in between the recognized stages in our historical narratives, whether as 
transitions or as inassimilable moments (Zammito 2004). This Sattelzeit of ‗Life‘ as a scientific 
and philosophical problem, prior to the emergence of biology as a positive science in the 
nineteenth century, combines both a mechanistic interest in structures, components and ‗how 
things are put together‘ with a recognition of the challenge created by new concepts of 
organism, body, animal economy etc.; and yet it does not hypostatize these concepts into 
transcendent entities beyond the reach of natural science. It is this radical, ontologically 
controversial aspect of Life that I have discussed here.40  
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1 A partial exception would be Kuhn 1976 precisely because he introduces a distinction between Baconian-
inductive programmes in natural philosophy and more mathematically oriented programmes. As recently as 
Biagioli 1998 the standard picture which disregards the life sciences is still reiterated, only now with a 
constructivist flourish that has accents of épater le bourgeois: we learn that historians of science still need the concept 
of the Scientific Revolution to preserve their employment (Biagioli 1998: 144); but we are able to challenge the 
existence of this historical episode: ―If we don't overdo it, we can safely bite the hand that feeds us‖ (146). 
2 Debus 1991, 2001 are exceptions, but they are precisely not ‗mainstream‘ Scientific Revolution narratives. My 
point is not that no one has studied early modern life science (the bibliography of the present essay is filled with 
references to such studies) but that such studies never seem to impact on the picture we have of the Scientific 
Revolution. Put differently, if we consider as crucial a figure as Harvey and we look at what mainstream history of 
modern science has to say about him, here is a sample result: ―Shapin‘s The Scientific Revolution has two derivative 
remarks, Gaukroger‘s comprehensive treatise on western scientific culture mentions him twice in passing, but only 
in the context of the science that came after him, and Dear‘s compilation of readings from Isis on early modern 
science omits him altogether. . . . Kuhn‘s celebrated analysis of radical disjuncture in the progressions of science 
sees Bacon, Copernicus, Lavoisier and Newton as revolutionary but not Harvey, who is excluded from his 
account entirely‖ (Salter 2010, Introduction). 
3 It is a mark of the extreme provincialism of the history and philosophy of early modern science that it is so 
preoccupied with endless internal controversies over externalism and internalism, the role of the Church, or the 
replicability of an experimentum crucis that it takes absolutely no notice of recent (and original) work on the 
specifically ‗biological‘ contribution to debates on substance, personal identity, species etc. in early modern 
thought, in which figures like Gassendi or Walter Charleton loom large (see notably Fisher (ed), 2003 and Smith 
(ed), 2006). National or linguistic provincialism (Anglocentrism) has been discussed elsewhere, notably with 
respect to Merton‘s and Shapin‘s theses. 
4 For an early attempt to answer this sort of question see Roger 1980: 258f. 
5 Bertoloni Meli 2008: 709. To my knowledge the first person to raise the issue was Salomon-Bayet 1978: 12, 15, 
112, 334 and in the Anglophone literature Cook 1990: 401-404. To mention one more example: out of fifteen 
essays by prominent scholars in a recent volume on ‗Rethinking the Scientific Revolution‘ (Osler [ed], 2000), not a 
single one treats the life sciences even secondarily. Kiernan 1968 argues for a split between physical sciences and 
life sciences throughout the eighteenth century in France, which is very strange, if we consider figures such as 
Maupertuis, who sought to extend Newtonian concepts into the realm of generation, or Buffon, who translated 
Stephen Hales and sought to produce a kind of ‗arithmetic‘ of life. Even Diderot declared that his essays on 
probability were, together with the Rêve de D’Alembert, his favourite amongst his writings (Diderot 1961: 126). 
6 The first case is now too frequently discussed for citations to be necessary; on the latter two cases see Salter and 
Wolfe 2009 and Wolfe and Terada 2008. 
7 E.g. Hahn 1971, a classic study of the Académie des Sciences, completely omits the life sciences; Kaplan 1993 
fails to consider that ‗embodied forms of knowledge‘ really were an issue for the Royal Society. Conversely, in a 
recent attempt to produce a historical survey of the philosophy of biology (Grene and Depew 2004), the authors 
bypass our era and thus our controversies entirely, by moving from Aristotle to Descartes and then to Buffon. 
That the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries might have expressed something of a ‗crisis‘ on topics such as 
body, species and the minimal constituents of living matter (e.g. Gassendi, Charleton, Lamy) is not an issue for 
this work. 
8 Thus Jacques Monod described the discovery that motivated him to go into biology: ―the scandal that certain 
objects exist with the properties of living beings and appearing to violate some physical principles or at least the 
general notion of the physical world. It seemed scandalous to me. I felt naïvely that one had to confront this 
scandal‖ (Monod 1970: 50). 
9 Foucault 1966, including the claim that ―l‘histoire naturelle, à l‘époque classique, ne peut pas se constituer comme 
biologie‖ (173). There has been much debate about what Foucault meant here, and rather than claim that my 
analysis rebuts his (for after all, I too am describing a series of inquiries into Life which are not constituted as 
biology), I will simply that my concern with Life as an object of controversy and/or crisis is not found in 
Foucault‘s discussion, nor is it affected by it. For an excellent, less tendentious discussion of the shifting meanings 
of ‗biology‘ and its predecessors, ‗physiology‘ and ‗natural history‘, and an analysis of the relation between 
‗philosophy‘ and these terms, see Gayon 1998. For the newer view that the eighteenth century was significantly 
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concerned with ‗vital‘ matters, see Reill 2005, which contains in-depth analyses of Buffon, Barthez and then 
Herder and the Humboldts, but is confusing taken as a whole since these figures do not seem to easily fit in one 
narrative. 
10 The classic, and influential statement of this view is Loeb 1912; see also Smith 1976 for suggestive, but 
inconclusive discussion. 
11 Buffon 1749, II, Histoire générale des animaux, ch. 1, ―Comparaison des animaux et des végétaux,‖ in Buffon 1954: 
238a-b; ibid., ch. 2, ―De la reproduction en général,‖ in Buffon 1954: 245b.  
12 Boyle, Origin of Forms and Qualities (1666), in Boyle 1772, vol. 3: 13; see also Some Considerations Touching the 
Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy, Second Tome (1671), in ibid., vol. 3: 427; Hall 1969, vol. 1: 294. 
13 For the former possibility see Westfall 1971: 104; for the latter distinction see Des Chene 2005: 249-250. 
14 That Boyle, in his work on final causes which I mention, as well as Leibniz explicitly do not reject final causes 
does not make their denial by Galileo, Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza any less canonical for the Scientific Revolution 
(or indeed its ideological inheritance from Fontenelle and Voltaire onwards). 
15 Glisson 1672, § 8; I quote from a draft translation of De Vita Naturae by Guido Giglioni, which he was kind 
enough to share with me. 
16 See Locke 1701/1975, II.xxvii.4-6 on the Life qua identity of plants, animals and humans in mereological terms. 
His last word on the question (ibid., III.x.22) does not advance the issue very much: the term ‗life‘ is obvious for 
everyone, but when one turns to the status of a plant in a seed, a chicken in an egg, or a dying man, its sense is harder 
to grasp.  
17 Gasking 1967: 40. Rather more à propos is that, whatever Harvey‘s epistemological approach towards 
circulation was (mechanistic? Aristotelean? empiricist? Paduan? hypothetico-deductive?), ―he did not attempt to 
formulate any general laws of life on a purely mechanical basis‖ (Ackerknecht 1982: 114). 
18 Above all, see Brown 1988, Turner 1984, Sawday 1995, Mandressi 2009 on ancient, modern and Renaissance 
régimes of the body; the section on ‗Bodies‘ in Cooter and Pickstone (eds) 2000; Wolfe and Gal (eds) 2010. 
19 In the Encyclopédie articles ―Fibre‖ and ―Nutrition‖ (VI: 670; XI: 288) the terms ―méchanisme‖ and organisme‖ 
are used interchangeably, e.g. ―the mechanism or organism of nutrition.‖ 
20 Leibniz to Hoffmann, 27 September 1699, in Hoffmann 1749: 49a-b, discussed in Duchesneau 1982: 82; 
Leibniz‘s reply to Stahl in Stahl 1720/1864: 14. For further discussion of the Leibniz-Stahl exchange as precisely a 
controversy see Carvallo 2010. 
21 Bourguet 1729, 4th letter, 73, 165-166; see Cheung 2006, § 2; also Duchesneau 2003; Linnaeus, Introduction to 
the Systema naturae (and of course in his celebrated aphorism that ‗Stones grow, plants grow, and live, animals 
grow, live and feel‘, in the Philosophia botanica); Lamarck in the Système des Animaux sans vertèbres, discussing the 
formation of the shell in mollusks (Lamarck 1801: 55). 
22 Letter to Malesherbes of October 30 1762, quoted in Savioz 1948: 214; Bonnet is admittedly protesting against 
the ban of his Considérations. 
23 The term ‗chymistry‘ is increasingly preferred in current scholarly usage, as it emphasizes the absence of a non-
arbitrary and historically justified analytic division between ‗chemistry‘ and ‗alchemy‘ in the early modern period. 
While there was certainly a range of theories and practices in the science of matter, ‗chemistry‘ and ‗alchemy‘ do 
not pick out a meaningful division within that range, and so the term ‗chymistry‘ is used as a general term for all 
such theories and practices, following Principe and Newman 1998. (Thanks to Lydia Barnett whose work helped 
me see this more clearly.) 
24 Bloch 1971: 252, n.75. On the shifting meanings of vital minima, notably ‗molecules‘, in seventeenth-century 
chemistry, matter theory and philosophy see, in addition to Bloch 1971, Clericuzio 2000: 63-71, and for the 
impact of semina rerum on early modern matter theory overall, Hirai 2005. 
25 I thank Justin E.H. Smith for this suggestion. Joly 2008 observes that Renaissance and early modern chymical 
treatises frequently describe minerals and metals in terms which we would only use for living beings (―seeds and 
germination, growth and rot, death and resurrection‖); he suggests that this is less because the chemists were 
intellectually chaotic and more because a doctrine of living being was simply absent. 
26 According to Clericuzio (ms., 2009), spirits, sulphur and salts are the active principles (with spirits being the 
most active), while earth and water are passive. Spirits affect various properties of the body, from heat to 
conservation to preventing putrefaction; e.g., the digestive system is described as a process of fermentation in the 
stomach. For a discussion of chemical vs. mechanical explanations of fermentation, see Mendelsohn 1964: 380; 
Chang 2002: 56, 59f. 
27 Willis, Of Feavers, in Willis 1659/1681, ch. I, § 1: 59 (pagination continous with Of Fermentation); Chang 2004: 
785. 
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28 Bates 1981 suggests that ―for Fernel [and all traditional Galenists], the essence of fever was preternatural heat 
whereas for Willis it was an inordinate motion of the blood‖ (49). 
29 Leibniz, ―Éclaircissement sur les Natures Plastiques et les Principes de Vie et de Mouvement‖ (1704), in Leibniz 
1978, vol. 6: 550. 
30 Chang 2002: 63. It‘s not always so clear-cut, though, because chemistry for Stahl is both something foreign to 
the theoria medica vera and nevertheless that which explains life (Roger 1979: 45). 
31 The word ‗vitalist‘ appears at much the same time as does the word ‗biology‘, a fact that has not so far been 
discussed much, if it all. On the history of the former, see Wolfe and Terada 2008; on the latter, see Caron 1988 
and Barsanti 2000. 
32 Deamer and Fleishaker 1994 is a useful collection on the issue. 
33 Haller 1751: 956 (a review of Volters‘ Gedancken von Psychologischen sachen), as quoted in Reill 2005: 123-124. 
34 T.S. Hall describes certain theories of Life in the eighteenth century (notably that of Maupertuis) as 
‗emergentist‘ (Hall 1968, vol. 2: 26-28); for additional discussion of how eighteenth-century models of organic life 
can be understood as ‗organizational‘ and thus beyond the split between reduction and emergence, see Wolfe and 
Terada 2008: 558-574. 
35 La Mettrie 1750/1987, sections 8-11; he thinks the moderns can improve experimentally on this view, but does 
not reject it wholeheartedly. 
36 Schmid 1798-1801, I: 140, cit. in Risse 1972: 153-154. See Schiller 1980: 85-87; Caron 1988: 231-232 for further 
indications on the early uses of ‗biology‘, ‗zoonomy‘ and the older ‗physiology‘ to designate the same science. 
37 Delamétherie 1787, II: 292, cited by Barsanti 2000: 124. 
38 Cuvier provides his own capsule history of the birth of life science qua science (i.e. as a system allowing for 
causal explanations): we have known the causal processes at work in digestion for centuries; the absorption of 
substances, since Pecquet, Rudbeck et Ruysch; the process of circulation, since Harvey. ―The work of the English 
and Italian anatomists on the lymphatic system has . . . completed everything that remained to be said in this 
regard‖ (Cuvier 1810: 208). 
39 Bernard 1879: 524, cited and discussed in Métraux 2004: 44-46. 
40 This is part of a broader project to examine the relationship between materialism and embodiment in early 
modern science and the Enlightenment – moving away from stereotypical schemas such as ‗mechanistic 
materialism‘ but also from certain theories of embodiment which oppose it to the concepts of natural science. See 
further Wolfe and Gal (eds) 2010, Huneman and Wolfe (eds) 2010, Wolfe and Terada 2008, Salter and Wolfe 
2009. 
